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Is Man Really Free - An Evaluation of Thomas Aquinas View on the Problem of Freedom and Determinism

 Department: Philosophy  
 By: usericon blaize  

 Project ID: 1830
   Rating:  (3.2) votes: 13
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   Price:₦3000
Abstract
The problem of Freewill and determinism has been an age long heated debate in the history of philosophy. There has always been the challenge to examine the argument that man is free, therefore, could be held responsible for whatever he does. Contrary to this, it is argued that man is not free for several reasons and as such, his actions are often predetermined and consequently should not be held responsible for whatever he does since he cannot do otherwise. In fact, freedom here is considered only as an illusion. By implication, this position contests that all human actions are determined by certain causes.  The question of the problem is a restless one. It has formed the major source of contention between some theologians and philosophers. As a result of this, there arise opposite positions. Obviously, the difficulty arising from the two positions is that often times none of them is prepared or ready to bend its position. This being the case, in most of the discourse on freewill and determinism, the emphasis has been on these divergent positions. Central to the discourse on whether man is free or not, the main objective of this work is to meticulously evaluate the view of Thomas Aquinas on the problem and to stress the need for a consonance by both positions. Consequently, the take is that there is an important dimension with respect to appreciating a compromise between the two contrary positions. It will prove fruitful if areas of convergence are considered and accepted in order to appreciate and reap the inherent dividends in their different stands....
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